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In this interview, which took place in July 2020, Muhammad Asghari, an associate 
professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tabriz, asked 
eleven questions (via email ) to Professor Susan Haack, a distinguished professor 
of philosophy at the University of Miami. This American philosopher eagerly and 
patiently emailed me the answers to the questions. The questions in this interview 
are mainly about analytic philosophy and pragmatist philosophy. 
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This interview was conducted via personal email between me and Professor Susan Haack 
in July 2020. This interview, which Professor Hawk eagerly accepted, includes eleven 
questions about her biography and roles of various philosophers in her thought and finally 
about the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism on her thought. Of course, it goes 
without saying that the Haack's book Philosophy of Logic in Iran has been translated into 
Persian1 and he has published two articles2 in the quarterly journal of Philosophical 
Investigations (University of Tabriz) and I also have translated one of her articles into Persian. 
What was most interesting to me was the influence of pragmatism on Haack's thought that 
Charles Sanders Pierce, among classical American pragmatists, had as much influence on this 
philosopher's thought as John Dewey had in Rorty's thought. Here I thank Professor Susan 




This interview was conducted by Muhammad Ashgari, Associate Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of Tabriz-Iran, with Professor Susan Haack, Distinguished 
Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and Sciences, Professor of 
Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of Miami. Haack’s books and articles have 
been published in 16 languages, including Spanish, Portuguese, French, Chinese, Korean, 
Croatian, and even Farsi.  
 
 
MA: Let’s start with your brief biography, how you came to philosophy, and 
which philosophers contributed to your ideas, and still have some continuing 
influence. 
 
SH: My undergraduate degree (from Oxford) was in Philosophy, Politics, and 
Economics; but I chose this with no clear idea what philosophy was, primarily because of my 
interest in politics and economics.  At the end of my degree program, my politics tutor 
encouraged me to go to graduate school in politics; but by then I was sure that philosophy 
would interest me for a lifetime, so I chose that instead: first the B.Phil. at Oxford, then the 
Ph.D. at Cambridge.   
 
                                                          
1. Haack, Susan (2019)”The Real Question: Can Philosophy Be Saved?” Trans. Muhammad Asghari(in 




2 . see her articles in this journal: 
Haack, Susan (2019)”Personal or Impersonal Knowledge?” in the quarterly journal of 
Philosophical Investigations (Volume 13, Issue 28 Autumn 2019/Pages 21-44) 
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9430_en.html 
Haack, Susan (2018) “Five Answers on Pragmatism” in the quarterly journal of Philosophical 
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At Oxford, I had many good teachers. Jean Austin, widow of J. L. Austin, was my first 
philosophy tutor; and later I studied Plato with Gilbert Ryle, logic with Michael Dummett, 
ethics with Philippa Foot, philosophy of language with David Pears, etc. 
 
In Cambridge, where I wrote my Ph.D. under Timothy Smiley, I benefited particularly  
from the presence of Elizabeth Anscombe and Ian Hacking. Anscombe was never my teacher, 
but she educated me by coming to lunch in the woman’s college to which we were both 
attached, checking to see I was there, and then saying something completely outrageous, like 
“nothing interesting was ever written on the philosophy of science.” I would protest; she 
would respond; and so on. I got indigestion, but I learned a lot!   
 
But the most important influences have been from those I have read: of course, the old 
pragmatists—Peirce, James, Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Oliver Wendell Holmes—but 
also many, many others: Plato, John Locke, Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill, Gottlob Frege, 
Bertrand Russell, for example. And not all, by any means, are philosophers: mathematician 
W.K. Clifford, physicist Percy Bridgman, and biologist Thomas Huxley have left their mark, 
for example, and so have many novelists.  
 
MA: Were you influenced by “continental” philosophers at all? 
 
SH: I don’t think so; I have read very little in that tradition. 
 
However, perhaps you are noticing that I have always thought, from the very beginning, 
that philosophy should seek both clarity and depth, both precision and breadth. The problem, 
of course, is to combine the two.   
 
MA: You have tackled issues in philosophy of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, 
etc. But you first became famous in the world of analytical philosophy for your books 
Deviant Logic (1974) and Philosophy of Logics (1978), while your writings today have 
less in common with the analytic mainstream than with classical pragmatism. In the 
recent article “The World and How We Know It” (2018) you write of the gradual 
evolution of your thought. Could we speak of the early and the later Haack, as of the 
early and the later Wittgenstein?     
 
SH:  The last part of your question makes it sound too much as if I shifted abruptly 
from supporting one football team to rooting for another! It wasn’t like that at all. I started 
doing philosophy the way I was taught and the way others around me did it; but gradually, 
gradually, as I matured, I found my own way. This way was indeed informed by the work of 
the classical pragmatists; but from my very first book (Deviant Logic, 1974) my work always 
had a pragmatist element; and it has never lost the analytic concern for clarity and rigor, or 
my early interest in disambiuation.    
 
Your question also makes it sound as if analytic philosophy were one, monolithic 
approach. It wasn’t. Some in this big tent were focused on natural language; some on formal, 
regimented languages; and some not on language but on our concepts. Think how different 
Frege was from Austin, for example, or Strawson from Quine.  
 
Moreover, you ignore that fact that over the years self-styled “analytic” philosophy has 
changed quite radically, and is now very far from its glory days. The old meticulous concern 
with language is now, to say the least, rare. And neo-analytic philosophy is now fragmented 
into many tiny niches, and has become not just neglectful of but downright hostile to the 
history of philosophy, and to real-life problems. By now, it is often infected with scientism, 
and often, also, formalistic without any real rigor: with elaborate apparatus but flimsy 
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underpinnings. Indeed, sometimes it seems there’s not much more to self-styled “analytic” 
philosophy today than a pseudo-rigorous manner, a liking for numbered theses and unhelpful 
definitions, and a certain self-image. I have come to think of it as a dying paradigm that has 
come, unfortunately, to be institutionally entrenched, the modus operandi of the “prestigious” 
departments and journals.        
 
MA: When and why did you move away from the analytic mainstream, and are 
there still elements of that approach in your later work? 
 
SH: I have already answered this question, at least in part. It was a gradual process, 
prompted mostly by my own philosophical development and reading, but in part by my 
dismay at the degeneration of the mainstream.  
 
But I can identify roughly when and why I began reading the old pragmatists seriously, 
rather than relying on excerpts and secondary sources. It was in the early 1970s (when I was 
teaching at the University of Warwick, U.K.). I was reading Quine’s Word and Object, and 
was struck by his very causal dismissal of Peirce’s account of  truth; so I went to the library, 
took out all 8 (!) volumes of Peirce’s Collected Papers, and started reading.  
 
No one heard from me for about six weeks; and then I emerged from my study saying, 
“my goodness, I just found a goldmine!”) Peirce’s really was a truly remarkable mind. It was 
a revelation to discover a philosopher who could be broad and deep at the same time; who 
wrote in real, human prose, not the stilted language of professional philosophy; who could 
call on an encyclopedic knowledge both of the history of science and of the history of 
philosophy; and who had so many startling and novel insights. Moreover, he as was as 
rigorous as the heroes of analytic philosophy, but vastly broader. I felt an immediate affinity 
with his repudiation of false dichotomies, and soon saw the importance of his neologisms, 
which enabled him to break out of old, false assumptions.    
 
Later, I began reading James seriously. He hadn’t Peirce’s logical noûs, I discovered, but 
he not only wrote with extraordinary warmth and charm, but also had remarkably shrewd 
insights into human nature and its quirks. Then I tried Dewey: long-winded, sometimes 
maddeningly vague and ambiguous, but with truly remarkable range, and an admirable 
willingness to get involved in “problems of men.” George Herbert Mead was tougher at first, 
his prose at times almost impenetrable; but in the end he proved enormously rewarding, a 
great source of insight into human mindedness and its evolutionary roots. 
 
Later yet, when I got interested in legal philosophy, I turned to Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
He was formidable at first, and I had to persist, learning legal subtleties as I went along; 
moreover, he had been seriously misinterpreted, I discovered, by many commentators. But 
eventually he too became a valued intellectual companion. 
   
In sum, I found in the old pragmatists a treasure-trove of ideas, richer and ampler than 
anything I previously encountered—and have been learning from them ever since.        
 
MA: Can you tell us more about what, specifically, you learned from the old 
pragmatists? 
 
SH: Yes, I can try. But I should start by saying that I don’t accept any idea because it’s 
pragmatist; rather, when I think things though, I find the old pragmatists’ attitudes, ideas, and 
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 I learned, for example, from Peirce’s combination of fallibilism and a “high 
faith in the reality of knowledge,” not to imagine that dogmatism and skepticism were 
the only possibilities; I learned valuable lessons for my own metaphysical approach 
from his reflections on the meaning of “real”; I began to appreciate that, like him, I 
had always looked for continuities; I realized, reflecting on his many neologisms and 
his thoughts about the growth of meaning, the many limitations of logical formalism 
and the importance of conceptual innovation; and (quite recently) I saw how his idea 
of philosophy as empirical, but as depending on close attention to everyday 
experience, not the on recherché experience sought be the sciences, why it can seem 
that philosophy can be done purely a priori, but it can’t.   
 
 I learned, for example, from James’s unconventional reflections a different 
way of looking at ethics (and, later, the law), and was helped in my thinking about the 
relation of philosophy and literature. And as you can see in my “The Differences that 
Make a Difference” (2011), I learned a lot from his defense of the importance of 
individuals, including how to resist the group-think taking over the American 
academy.  
 
 I learned from Dewey, for example, a way of thinking of the continuity of 
the sciences with everyday inquiry, and more about ethics. Of course, I acquired his 
splendid phrase for the false dichotomies all the pragmatists shunned: “untenable 
dualisms.” He helped me think about education, the slipperiness of the concept of 
democracy and its abuse by authoritarian regimes, and even about art.   
 
 My thinking about mind and language was helped immeasurably by Mead’s 
earlier, clumsily expressed but very insightful, efforts. 
 
 And my thinking about the law as a constantly evolving human institution 
owes a great deal to Holmes. 
 
MA: Do you admire Rorty, also a pragmatist? What are the differences between 
your pragmatism and Rorty’s?  
 
SH: No, I emphatically don’t admire Rorty! In fact, I was perhaps Rorty’s most effective 
critic—even mentioned in his obituary as such!  
 
In my view, what Rorty offered was a confused farrago of vaguely post-modern ideas 
under the grossly misleading label “pragmatism.” He dismissed Peirce, perhaps the best 
philosophical mind America has ever produced, as a “whacked-out triadomaniac” whose only 
contribution to pragmatism was to give it its name; my “We Pragmatists: Peirce and Rorty in 
Conversation” (1996) shows how Peirce and Rorty disagreed about practically everything; and 
that Peirce’s is by far the better mind. 
 
Rorty didn’t understand even Dewey, whom he most professed to admire, but on the 
contrary kept offering us what Dewey would have known were absurdly false dichotomies. 
Either truth is Correspondence to Things in Themselves, or it is just what you can defend 
against all conversational objections; either philosophy is the handmaid of the sciences, or it 
is nothing but another genre of literature; etc., etc.  In short, as I pointed out in Evidence and 
Inquiry (1993) and argued in detail in “Pining Away in the Midst of Plenty” (2016), his whole 
philosophy is infected with a pernicious This-or-Nothingism.  
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So PLEASE don’t confuse me with Rorty! Ironically, I’m not given to describing myself 
as a pragmatist, though I have often said my work is informed by classical pragmatism. Rorty, 
however, is quick to claim the label, but what he offers really isn’t recognizable as pragmatism 
at all. We had nothing in common, except perhaps a sense that the analytic paradigm of 
philosophy was in trouble.  
 
In brief, our deep disagreements include:  
 
 I think philosophy is a form of inquiry; Rorty denies this, claiming instead 
that it is a genre of literature, just “a kind of writing.” 
 
 I think epistemology and metaphysics are core, and crucial, parts of 
philosophy (and have devoted much time to them); Rorty claims they are illegitimate, 
and should simply be abandoned and not replaced.  
 
 I think there is such a thing as objective truth; Rorty boasts that he “hasn’t 
much use” for this concept. 
 
 I think there are objective standards of better and worse evidence, and have 
spent many years working to articulate them; Rorty claims these are nothing but social 
convention.  
    
I was always somewhat puzzled why Rorty became so famous for his hopelessly 
confused ideas. Perhaps it was that he wrote rather better than the usual stilted analytic style; 
perhaps, that he was well-connected and based in prestigious universities (Princeton, Virginia, 
Stanford); perhaps that many sympathized with his left-wing political ideas. Or perhaps it was 
just that becoming famous, not working things out, that he really most wanted. But I don’t 
believe, when the history of that period of philosophy is written, he will be more than a 
footnote. In any case, he was no pragmatist, only someone who kidnapped the name!   
 
MA: You have written that reality is complex, and our knowledge of it inevitably 
incomplete. We live in a pluralistic universe, you say. Can you explain further? 
 
SH: My metaphysical theory, Innocent Realism, indeed, says that the world is a pluralistic 
universe, and very complex; but it says much more. Is summarized in “The World and How 
We Know It” (2018) like this:  
 
[M]y Innocent Realism begins with the thought that there are many things 
(laws, kinds, our mental states and processes, etc.) which, though certainly real, 
aren’t existent particulars; and that what “real” means is neither “independent 
of us,” nor “independent of our minds,” but something more like 
“independent of what you or I or anyone believes about it.”  
 
There is one real world, Innocent Realism continues; but this one real 
world is a pluralistic universe, extraordinarily various and multi-faceted and 
yet, at the same time, unified. “Our” part of the world, the earth we humans 
inhabit, is just one corner of a vast universe, which may itself be only one of 
many multi-universes. But in this corner, besides the enormous variety of 
natural stuff, things, kinds, events, phenomena, laws, etc., there is also the 
almost unimaginable range of human beliefs, hopes, fears, etc., and a dense 
mesh of human creations, physical and mental, intellectual and imaginative: 
physical artifacts; social institutions; intellectual constructions such as 
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languages, notation systems, concepts, and theories; and imaginative creations 
such as myths, legends, and folk tales, works of art, plays, poems, works of 
fiction, and the imagined places, people, and scenarios they introduce.  
 
This is how Innocent Realism connects with philosophy of the law (an important 
social artifact) and with philosophy of literature (a vital imaginative artifact.) 
 
I continue:  
 
Like the enormous variety of artifacts they have enabled us to create, our 
thoughts and ideas make this part of the world even more remarkably complex 
than the rest. And, while everything is anchored in natural reality—in the 
architecture and functioning of our brains, in the physical material of 
buildings, books, boats, and so on—this is not to say that it’s all, ultimately, 
explicable by physics. In the Innocent Realist conception, all the stuff there is 
in the world is physical, and of course subject to physical laws; nevertheless, 
there’s much more to understanding the world than even a hypothetical 
completed physics could give us.  
 
MA: You have also written that the content of our beliefs can’t be 
explained by physics, but is in part cultural. Does this mean you agree with 
Rorty that truth is made, not discovered?  
 
SH: Again, absolutely not! That is another serious misunderstanding.  
 
What it is to believe something is to have a bunch of complex dispositions to verbal and 
non-verbal behavior, which are realized in the physical structure of our brains and nervous 
systems; but the content of the beliefs depends on the relation of those words in our linguistic 
community to things, events, etc., in the world. What makes something the belief that tigers 
are dangerous, for instance, is cultural; but what makes it true is that tigers are dangerous.  
 
It obviously doesn’t follow that, as Rorty claims, truth is made by us, not discovered; 
indeed, I criticize Rorty on this at some length in Evidence and Inquiry, chapter 9. This is not 
to deny that some truths, e.g., legal truths, really, are made by things people do; but even such 
truths, once made, can then be discovered.  
 
MA: You have also written about the philosophy of economics. How did this 
come about?  
 
SH: I corresponded for many years with historian of economics Robert L. Heilbroner, 
which is where my interest in philosophy of economics began. This was in any case part of 
the much larger project in philosophy of science advanced in my Defending Science—Within 
Reason (2003): a project prompted by an invitation to speak at a panel on “What Do the 
Natural Sciences Know, and How do They Know It?” at which I shared a platform with 
Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg.  
 
MA: What about your interest in philosophy of literature? 
 
SH: I have always read widely in English literature, and eventually realized that many of 
the novels I most loved were essentially epistemological; that’s where my interest in 
philosophy of literature began. For example, in “The Ideal of Intellectual Integrity, in Life and 
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Literature” (2005), I spell out some of the important truths Samuel Butler’s wonderful novel 
The Way of All Flesh can teach us about hypocrisy, self-deception, and sham inquiry. 
 
But of course to say, as I do, that a novel can sometimes convey subtleties about human 
nature much better than an academic article is not to say, as Rorty does, that philosophy is 
just a branch of literature, nor that truth is a kind of illusion: far from it! Nor is it to suggest 
that philosophy is secondary to literature, or vice-versa; I can make no sense of such claims. 
 
MA: Some American philosophers in the tradition of analytic philosophy seem 
now to be tending towards Pragmatism. What is the reason for this tendency? 
 
SH: I’m not sure why you think this. But I conjecture that perhaps what you have noticed 
is the surprising popularity of Robert Brandom’s so-called “analytic pragmatism.” However, 
this is in effect mainly a development of late-Wittgensteinian ideas in philosophy of language. 
It appeals to analytic philosophers precisely because it’s NOT real pragmatism, but something 
much more familiar, more analytic than pragmatist. Probably the formidable opacity of 
Brandom’s writing also helps, inviting scads of Ph.D. students to debate endlessly what he 
meant!    
 
But no, I see no trend towards real pragmatism. American professional philosophy is 
still dominated by the neo-analytics, and interest in the classical pragmatist tradition is still the 
province only of a small minority. Might there be such a trend in the future? I can’t guess; no 
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